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ABSTRACT
How does the need to signal quality through price affect equilibrium pricing and profits,
when a firm faces a similarly-situated rival?  In this paper, we provide a model of non-cooperative
signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers.  We assume “universal
incomplete information;” that is, each market participant has some private information: each
consumer has private information about the intensity of her preferences for the firms’ respective
products and each firm has private information about its own product’s quality.  We characterize a
symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm’s price reveals its respective product quality.
We focus mainly on a model in which the quality attribute is safety (so that the legal system
is brought into play) and quality is unobservable due to the use of confidential settlements; a
particular specification of parameters yields a common model from the industrial organization
literature in which quality is interpreted as the probability that a consumer will find the good
satisfactory.  We show that the equilibrium prices, the difference between those prices, the
associated outputs, and profits are all increasing functions of the ex ante probability of high safety.
When quality is interpreted as consumer satisfaction, unobservable quality causes all prices to be
distorted upward, and lowers average quality and ex ante expected social welfare, but increases ex
ante expected firm profits (when either the probability of high quality or the extent of horizontal
product differentiation is sufficiently high).  When quality is interpreted as product safety, the
foregoing results are modified in that for some parameter values ex ante expected social welfare is
higher under confidentiality because such legal secrecy lowers expected litigation costs.  
1.  Introduction
How does the need to signal quality through price affect equilibrium pricing and profits,
when a firm faces a similarly-situated rival?  In this paper, we provide a model of non-cooperative
signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers.  We characterize a symmetric
separating equilibrium in which each firm’s price reveals its respective product quality, and we
indicate how crucial parameters affect the price-quality relationship.  Finally, we describe
circumstances under which the firms are better off for having to signal quality through price (as
compared to an informational regime in which their qualities are exogenously known by competitors
and by consumers).  Note, this contrasts with the results for a monopoly model, in which the usual
signaling distortions are disadvantageous to the firm.
We assume “universal incomplete information;” by this, we mean that each market
participant has some private information.  Each consumer views the products as imperfect
substitutes; all else equal, some consumers will prefer one firm’s product while other consumers will
prefer that of the firm’s rival.  Each consumer has private information about the intensity of her
preference for the firms’ respective products.  We assume that each firm has private information
about its own product’s quality.  To the best of our knowledge, signaling quality with this
information structure has not been addressed previously in the literature; a more detailed discussion
of this literature is provided below.
While we focus mainly on a model in which the quality attribute is safety (so that the legal
system is brought into play), a particular specification of parameters yields a common model from
the industrial organization literature in which quality is interpreted as the probability that a consumer
will find the good satisfactory (as in Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).  In the product safety context, we
view private information on the part of firms as arising through the use of confidential settlements.
2Daughety and Reinganum (2003) provide a two-period model in which a single firm produces and
sells a product in one period, and then observes the number of units that fail, causing harm.
Assuming that consumers harmed in period one (with viable cases) negotiate confidential
settlements, consumers in the second period know that the firm has private information about its
product’s safety.
We view confidentiality as having several effects; some of these effects arise in the single-
firm context, while others arise only in the multi-firm context.  First, confidentiality may reduce the
viability of contemporaneous suits, by keeping plaintiffs separated and unable to share information
that might improve the viability of their cases.  Second, as indicated above, a firm that has settled
previous lawsuits confidentially will have private information (both relative to current consumers
and relative to its rival) about its product’s safety.  In this case, consumers will attempt to draw an
inference about the firm’s product’s safety from its price; that is, the firm’s price may be used to
signal its product’s safety.  Finally, since the firm observes neither the intensity of the consumer’s
preference for its product (versus that of its rival) nor its rival’s product safety, the firm must charge
all consumers the same price and must make its pricing decisions based upon its own product’s
safety and upon its conjectures about the rival firm’s price-safety strategy.  Of course, these
conjectures must be correct in equilibrium.
We find that, for the two-type model presented below, there exists a unique symmetric
separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium (we restrict attention to symmetric separating equilibria),
in which high quality is revealed by a high price.  Although it is typical in monopoly signaling
models that a separating equilibrium depends only on the support of the distribution, in this case
uncertainty about the other firm’s type will introduce distribution-dependence into the equilibrium
31  Some exceptions in the literature considering signaling by one firm do exist; see Matthews
and Mirman (1983) and Daughety and Reinganum (1995, 2003).
2  Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001b, p. 622) make the following observation:  “... if prices
are strategic complements, a successful separating strategy might dampen the intensity of price
competition, resulting in higher profits to both the high-quality and the low-quality firm than in a
case of intensive Bertrand Competition between suppliers of products that are perceived as
homogeneous by consumers.” However, they do not follow up on this issue, nor do they provide an
example in which the conjectured effect arises.  Their paper is discussed in more detail below.
price function.1  We find that the interim prices (that is, the price that would be charged by a firm
which knows its own type, but not that of the rival firm), as well as the difference between these
type-specific prices, are increasing functions of the prior probability of high quality, as is the ex ante
expected price.  In addition, the interim profits (that is, the profits for a firm which knows its own
type, but not that of the rival firm) are also increasing in the prior probability of high quality.
Although we are unable to establish such a general property for ex ante expected profits, we show
that ex ante expected profits are higher when the firms need to signal their qualities (compared to
an informational regime in which their qualities are exogenously known by consumers), if the prior
probability of high quality is sufficiently high or the extent of horizontal product differentiation is
sufficiently large.  This can occur because signaling involves prices that are distorted upwards; while
this distortion is disadvantageous for a single firm, non-cooperative price-setting firms would (under
full information about quality) end up charging less than they would (jointly) prefer.  Thus, the need
to signal constitutes a credible commitment to distort prices upward, which can be advantageous for
non-cooperative firms.2
Related Literature
There are several strands of related literature.  Although these papers often address broader
issues, we focus here on their implications for price-quality signaling.  One relevant body of work
43  Bagwell (1992) conducts a related analysis of a monopolist producing a product “line.”
4  This refinement process ultimately yields an equilibrium in which firms charge a price
equal to marginal cost independent of their quality or that of their rival. 
is the industrial organization literature on price as a signal of quality.  Bagwell and Riordan (1991)
provide a monopoly model in which quality may be high or low, with higher quality being produced
at a higher unit cost.  They show that the low-quality firm chooses its full information price, while
the high-quality firm distorts its price upward relative to the full-information price for high quality.3
Daughety and Reinganum (1995) provide a monopoly model (with a continuum of types) in which
quality is interpreted as safety.  In this case, when a product fails and harms a consumer, the liability
system specifies an allocation of the associated loss across the parties.  They show that higher prices
signal safer products when the consumer bears a sufficiently high portion of the loss, while lower
prices signal safer products when the firm bears a sufficiently high portion of the loss.  Hertzendorf
and Overgaard (2001a) consider a duopoly model in which consumers do not know either firm’s
quality, but both firms know both firms’ qualities.  Consumers view the products as perfect
substitutes (if their prices and qualities were the same), and production costs are assumed to be
quality-independent.  The model has a large number of candidates for equilibrium, and the paper’s
focus is on selecting among them using various refinements.4  
Several papers consider price and advertising jointly as a signal of quality; while we consider
only price signals, these papers often have equilibria which involve only price signals.  Milgrom and
Roberts (1986) provide a monopoly model in which quality may be high or low, the cost of high
quality may be higher or lower than that of low quality, and repeat sales are an important attribute
of the model.  They identify various conditions under which  high quality may be signaled with a
55  Hertzendorf (1993) argues that, if advertising is stochastically-observed, price and
advertising expenditure will never be used in combination.  Another interesting paper is Linnemer
(1998), in which a firm uses price and advertising to signal to two different audiences: it signals its
product quality to consumers and its marginal cost to a potential entrant.  Since the firm wants to
signal high quality via a high price and low cost via a low price, in equilibrium the price may be
either higher or lower than the full information price.  When the equilibrium price is distorted
upward, advertising expenditure may be used to signal low cost.
6  Bagwell and Ramey (1991) consider a limit pricing model in which two incumbent firms
with common private information about production costs attempt to deter entry using price
strategies.  This paper is more closely-related to the models of Hertzendorf and Overgaard and Fluet
and Garella, than to ours.
high price alone, a low price alone, or a combination of price and advertising expenditure.5
Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001b) and Fluet and Garella (2002) examine very similar duopoly
models in which firms use price and, possibly, advertising expenditure, to signal their qualities.
While consumers do not know either firm’s quality, again both firms know both firms’ qualities.6
Moreover, consumers do not have a preference between the two goods, provided they are of the
same quality and charge the same price (i.e., there is no horizontal differentiation).  They find that
price alone can signal quality when vertical differentiation is substantial, but otherwise advertising
is required as well.  When advertising is not used, quality is signaled with upward-distorted prices,
but when advertising is used, prices may be driven below their full-information levels.
Our model also involves a duopoly in which firms use price to signal product quality, but
it differs from those models described above in two important respects.  First, consumers regard the
products as being differentiated horizontally as well as (potentially) vertically.  Second, each firm’s
quality is its private information; we believe that this latter assumption is more realistic than
assuming that the firms know each others’ quality, especially in the context of safety attributes
which are unknown due to the use of confidential settlements.
6 There is also a small literature on non-cooperative signaling when each firm has private
information (but not in the quality-signaling context).  Mailath (1989) describes an n-firm oligopoly
engaged in non-cooperative price competition across two periods.  A firm’s first-period price can
signal its (privately observed) marginal cost of production, which influences its rivals’ pricing
behavior in the second period.  Mailath (1988) establishes conditions guaranteeing the existence of
separating equilibria in abstract two-period games with simultaneous signaling.
Finally, there is some previous work on the issue of confidentiality in settlement
negotiations.  Papers addressing the impact of confidential settlement on sequential bargaining by
a defendant facing a series of plaintiffs include Yang (1996) and Daughety and Reinganum (1999,
2002).  The paper most closely-related to this one is Daughety and Reinganum (2003), in which a
monopolist produces over two periods.  Following first-period production, the monopolist learns its
product’s quality, which is interpreted as the probability that the product does not harm the
consumer; thus, quality is a safety attribute.  In a regime of confidentiality, the firm settles lawsuits
with harmed consumers confidentially; this (potentially) reduces the viability of suits and prevents
consumers from learning product safety.  In the second period, the firm has the option to replace an
input, thus drawing a new level of safety, or to retain it, thus maintaining the current safety level.
Second-period consumers know that the firm has private information about safety, and thus they
adjust their beliefs based on observing that the input was retained and based on the second-period
price.  As a consequence, consumers confront higher prices with a lower probability of purchase.
Thus, although confidentiality lowers the firm’s expected liability costs, it also depresses demand
for its product.  Daughety and Reinganum (2003) characterize when this trade-off induces the firm
to prefer confidentiality versus a regime of openness (in which suits cannot be settled confidentially,
77  See Hare, et. al., (1988), a text for attorneys on obtaining/opposing confidentiality orders;
which indicates that seeking such orders in products liability cases is “routine.”  See the Manual for
Complex Litigation, Third Edition (1995), section 21.431-432, for details on protective orders
(which provide for sealing of discovery and subsequent materials).  The Manual, which is published
by the Federal Judicial Center, is a case management guide for judges. See Garfield (1998) for a
discussion of contracts of silence.
8  Approximately one-fifth of the states (and the federal government) have recently
considered “sunshine” laws that would restrict confidentiality if it would significantly endanger
and thus consumers also learn the firm’s product’s safety).  
In this paper, we consider the additional effects of confidentiality on firm prices and profits
that arise when a firm faces competition from a rival.  We focus on a single period in which (e.g.,
as a consequence of previous production experience in a regime of confidentiality) each firm is
assumed to know its own product safety, but not that of its rival.  Consumers are assumed to know
their own preferences, but not the safety of either product.  Moreover, we assume that if confidential
settlement is permitted, then firms cannot commit themselves not to engage in it.  However, if
confidential settlement were banned, then both firms and consumers would know both products’
safety levels.
Confidential settlement is currently permitted (and widely practiced), although with some
judicial oversight.  One means of ensuring confidentiality is the use of protective orders issued by
the court itself; these may keep everything (from initial discovery through final settlement) secret,
under pain of court-enforced contempt citations.  The other common route is through voluntary
dismissal of a suit accompanied by a “contract of silence” which stipulates damages should either
party breach confidentiality.7  Thus, to ban confidential settlement, courts would have to refrain from
issuing protective orders, and they would also have to undermine (i.e., refuse to enforce) contracts
of silence.8  Banning confidentiality seems like a formidable task, but the full information case still
8public health and safety (leaving much of products liability unaffected).  Federal judges in South
Carolina recently agreed to eschew confidentiality in “everything from products liability cases to
child-molestation claims and medical malpractice suits.”  See, for example, Collins (2002).  Such
court-instigated changes, as well as the sunshine laws (with the exception of one enacted in Texas),
generally do not apply to unfiled agreements (see Gale Group, 2003).  Thus, contracts of silence
with penalties for breach are likely to remain enforceable.
9  http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/faculty/Daughety/C&CSupplementaryAppendix.pdf
provides a useful benchmark against which to assess the impact of confidentiality.
Plan of the Paper
In Section 2, we describe the model, including the timing and information structure, the
nature of horizontal and vertical differentiation, and the two alternative interpretations of product
quality that we will consider (e.g., product safety and consumer satisfaction).  In Section 3, we
characterize equilibrium prices, outputs and profits under the open and confidential regimes,
respectively, and in Section 4 these equilibrium expressions are compared.  Finally, Section 5
provides a discussion of potential extensions and conclusions.  The Appendix contains the derivation
of the separating equilibrium and relevant formulae; additional supporting material is in the
Supplementary Appendix.9
2.  Model Structure
We consider an industry comprised of two firms, named A and B, producing products which
are horizontally and vertically differentiated, and a continuum of consumers (where the aggregate
mass of consumer demand is N).  We will contrast decisions made by firms and consumers under
each of two possible “regimes” associated with settlement bargaining, one wherein all such bargains
are commonly observable to all agents (“open,” denoted O), and one wherein the existence and
details of the bargain are only known by the parties to the settlement (“confidential,” denoted C).
9Alternatively put, open settlements are taken as being consistent with common knowledge of the
safety level of each firm, while confidential settlements are taken as being consistent with each
firm’s safety level being private information known by it alone.  Note that this means that neither
the firm’s competitor, nor consumers, know a firm’s actual safety when the regime is C.  In what
follows we will use a superscript ‘r’ to indicate the informational regime.
Timing
This subsection provides a brief overview of the timing of the game; details will be provided
in the subsections to follow.  There are four stages to the game, denoted 0, 1, 2, and 3.  In Stage 0,
Nature picks each firm’s type, which will reflect vertical differentiation with respect to safety level
associated with the product.  Thus, all else equal, vertical differentiation will mean that consumers
prefer a product that is safer to one that is less safe.  Simultaneously and independently, Nature also
picks each consumer’s type (which reflects preferences over other attributes of the firm’s products,
and thereby provides for horizontal differentiation of the products).
In Stage 1, each firm and each consumer learns his type.  Furthermore, if the regime is O,
each firm’s type becomes common knowledge to all agents.  Next, but still within Stage 1, firms
simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose prices for their products, employing all the
information they have.  In Stage 2, consumers observe prices, choose a firm from which to buy, and
make actual purchases; firms produce to order and thereby incur production costs in this stage.
Stage 3 involves use of the products by the consumers, the possibility of harm occurring, and the
resolution of any viable lawsuits via settlement.
When we speak of ex ante expected values (for example, ex ante expected profits), we are
performing such computations at the end of Stage 0 and before the beginning of Stage 1.  When we
10
10  In particular, these computations are ex ante of product use and any resulting harm and
settlement.  Thus, Stage 3 is simply an appropriate (post-market-transaction) continuation game.
11  In our analysis of the duopoly case, we assume that V is always large enough so that the
entire market is “covered” (that is, all consumers buy from one firm or the other).
speak of ex post (or realized) values, we are performing such computations at the end of Stage 2 and
before the beginning of Stage 3.10  Finally, in the C-regime case, wherein each firm must choose
prices in Stage 1 without knowing the type of its rival, we will speak of interim values (interim has
no distinctive meaning in the O-regime).  As will become clear, the interim equilibrium prices for
the firms in the C-regime become the realized prices in Stage 2.
Horizontal Differentiation
Each consumer has a preference ordering over the consumption of the two products;
horizontal differentiation is captured by assuming that consumers are willing to pay V for one unit
of product A, and V + ( for one unit of product B, where ( is a consumer-specific incremental value
of product B relative to product A.  All else equal, some consumers value a unit of product B more
highly than they do a unit of Product A and some value a unit of product B less highly than a unit
of product A; the net value (all else equal) is captured by (.  This incremental value is private
information for each consumer and lies in the interval [-,, ,], with , > 0.  Alternatively put, in Stage
0, Nature chooses (for each consumer) a value of ( in the type space [-,, ,], and provides this
private information to each consumer in Stage 1.   The prior distribution of ( on this interval is
common knowledge for all agents and is denoted F; for tractability, we will assume that F is the
uniform distribution on [-,, ,], that is, F(() = (( + ,)/2,.11
Vertical Differentiation
The two products are vertically differentiated with respect to safety.  Use of a product may
11
12  Harm may be stochastic, but we assume that it is verifiable at the time of settlement; in
this case, * can be viewed as the expected harm.
13  This paper takes the liability regime as given.  Also, see the discussion in the
Supplementary Appendix as to why compensation is determined by the tort system rather than ex
ante contracting.
cause harm, and harm results in losses incurred by the consumer.  The probability of accident-free
use of product i, i = A, B, is denoted 2i, which can take on one of two possible values, 2H or 2L, with
1 > 2H > 2L > 0; all else equal, any consumer will prefer a product with a higher level of safety
(higher 2) to one with a lower level of safety.  The effect of this quality attribute (safety) on a
consumer is that if she buys a unit of product i and uses it, then with probability 1 - 2i the consumer
will suffer a harm.  More precisely, in Stage 0 the type space for each firm is {H, L}, and Nature’s
choice for each firm follows the commonly-known prior probability 8 = Pr{2i = 2H}, i = A, B.  Let
the ex ante expected safety for a firm be denoted :; that is, : = 82H + (1 - 8)2L.    For simplicity,
we assume that the unit cost of production is constant in quantity but increasing in the level of
safety, so that the marginal cost of producing a unit with safety 2 is k2.
Alternative Stage 3 Continuation Games
   Quality as Product Safety
Harm, suit, settlement, and trial create costs and generate losses that the parties must bear.
In particular, suppose that it is common knowledge that each harmed consumer (a potential plaintiff,
P) suffers an injury in the amount *, should an accident occur.12 Assuming that the firm (the
potential defendant, denoted D) is strictly liable for the harms it causes, * is the amount of damages
P would receive if successful at trial.13  Moreover, there are costs of engaging in settlement activity
and, if there is trial, there are court costs.  In the American system, the costs of negotiation and of
12
14  The same litigation subgame structure was used in the monopoly model of Daughety and
Reinganum (2003), and this discussion draws heavily on the one in that paper; a synopsis of this
subgame is provided in the Supplementary Appendix.  For surveys of the settlement literature, see
Hay and Spier (1998) and Daughety (2000).
trial are borne by the individual parties to the suit.   Rather than provide a detailed model in the main
text,14 we simply posit that the expected loss borne by a harmed consumer is given by LP(<) and the
expected loss borne by the firm when a consumer is harmed is given by LD(<), where < represents
the probability that the consumer’s case is viable.
Simply knowing that one has been harmed by the product is not sufficient to win at trial;
rather, P must provide convincing evidence of causation, even under strict liability.  Therefore, we
assume that there is a probability, denoted <r, r = O, C, that a consumer will be able to provide
convincing evidence (i.e., has a “viable” case).  With probability 1 - <r, other intervening factors
may cloud the relationship between product use and harm, undermining the viability of the
consumer’s case.  One effect of confidential settlement is to prevent plaintiffs from learning about
each others’ cases and sharing information that might improve the viability of their cases (see Hare,
et. al., 1988; they argue that this is an important reason for defendants to seek confidentiality).  Thus,
we assume that <C < <O.  Moreover, we assume that when a consumer complains of harm to the firm,
it is common knowledge (between the parties) whether the consumer has a viable case.  Thus, a
plaintiff with a non-viable case receives nothing, while a plaintiff with a viable case receives a
settlement.  To complete the description, assume that LP(0) = *, dLP(<)/d< < 0, LP(<) > 0 for all <,
LD(0) = 0, dLD(<)/d< > 0, L(<)/ LP(<) + LD(<) is the joint loss, and dL(<)/d< > 0.  Thus, increased
viability reduces P’s uncompensated losses, increases D’s expected losses from liability, and
increases their joint losses.  Finally, let LPr / LP(<r), LDr  / LD(<r) and Lr / L(<r) for r = O, C.
13
   Quality as Consumer Satisfaction
A special case of the above subgame corresponds to the industrial organization model in
which a firm uses price to signal the quality of an experience good.  In this version of the model,
quality is interpreted as the probability that a consumer is completely satisfied with the product;
higher-quality products have a higher probability of consumer satisfaction.  When the consumer is
dissatisfied with the product, she experiences a loss of * (relative to V).  Since satisfaction is
unverifiable, no firm would offer a warranty on such a product (ex post, every consumer would
claim to be dissatisfied), and thus there are no transfers from the firm to dissatisfied consumers.
This corresponds to the special case of <C = <O = 0, resulting in LDr  = 0 and LPr  =  *, for r = O, C.
Welfare
The social cost of a unit is the sum of the production costs and the joint expected losses
arising from harm.  Thus, for regime r, the social cost associated with a unit of safety 2, SCr(2), is
(1 - 2)Lr + k2.  We focus on the case wherein increasing safety reduces overall social costs and
therefore make the following assumption.
Assumption 1:   SCr(2) is a decreasing function of 2.
The immediate implication is that Lr > k, r = O, C.  We will also assume (to maintain interiority of
the solutions) that price-cost margins and quantities sold are always positive.  We will therefore
employ various parameter restrictions, which we will note as they arise.
Social welfare under regime r, when firm A’s product provides safety level 2A and firm B’s
product provides safety level 2B, is:
SWr(2A, 2B) = N{IMA(V - SCr(2A))f(()d( + IMB(V + ( - SCr(2B))f(()d(},
where MA = [-,, 'r(2A, 2B)] is the equilibrium interval of consumers constituting the market for
14
product A, MB = ['r(2A, 2B), ,] is the equilibrium interval of consumers constituting the market for
product B, and 'r(2A, 2B) is the equilibrium marginal consumer (the consumer who is just indifferent
between products A and B, given equilibrium prices chosen by the firm).  This marginal consumer,
whose identity also depends upon the regime, is found in equilibrium, since prices set in Stage 1 act
to sort consumers into those who choose to buy product A and those who choose to buy product B.
Note that (, + 'r(2A, 2B))/2, is the proportion of the interval [-,, ,] associated with purchase of
product A; that is, firm A’s product “captures” more (less) of the market than firm B’s product as
'r(2A, 2B) is greater (less) than 0.
Other Notational Conventions
Lower case letters will be used to designate (un-optimized, or random values of) variables
such as prices, output levels, and profits, possibly as a function of other variables (for example,
Stage 2 profits before prices are picked).  Equilibrium values of variables will be indicated by capital
letters and will exploit the symmetry inherent in the model.  Ex ante expected equilibrium variables
will only carry the supercript for the regime (for example, the ex ante O-regime profit for a firm is
denoted as E2[AO]).  Interim equilibrium values of variables will have a subscript indicating firm
type (for example, PLC is the equilibrium price posted by an L-type firm in the C-regime).  Ex post
values of the variables will have a superscript indicating regime and two subscripts (s and t):  the
first subscript indicates a firm’s type and the second subscript indicates that firm’s rival’s type.
Thus, QOHL denotes the output for a firm producing a high-safety product and facing a rival producing
a low-safety product, under the O-regime.  Furthermore, at some intermediate steps of the analysis,
a subscript i or j will be used to indicate firm name (as opposed to firm type), when this acts to
clarify the role of rivalry and will not cause confusion with firm type.  Finally, A’s (B’s) type is 2A
15
(2B), but we will also use the notation that a firm’s type is 2s and its rival’s type is 2t, where s and
t can be H or L; for example, 2B = 2L means that firm B is an L-type firm.
3.  Regime-Specific Results
Analysis When Product Safety is Common Knowledge
In this analysis the regime is r = O, so that the safety levels of the two products are common
knowledge before pricing and purchasing of output occurs.  Given the prices pA and pB, a consumer
of type ( will buy one unit of product A if:
V - (pA + (1 - 2A)LPO) > V - (pB + (1 - 2B)LPO) + (;
otherwise he will buy one unit of product B.  Thus, for any pair of prices pA and pB, the marginal
type of consumer is (O = pB - pA - (2B - 2A)LPO .  Hence, the aggregate demand for product A when
settlements are open, denoted qOA(pA, pB, 2A, 2B), is NF(pB - pA - (2B - 2A)LPO) and the aggregate
demand for product B, denoted qOB(pA, pB, 2A, 2B), is N[1 - F(pB - pA - (2B - 2A)LPO)].  Using our
assumption that F is the uniform distribution, this means that qOA(pA, pB, 2A, 2B) = N[, + pB - pA -
(2B - 2A)LPO]/2, while qOB(pA, pB, 2A, 2B) =  N[, + pA - pB - (2A - 2B)LPO]/2,.  Note that the aggregate
demand for each product is downward-sloping in its own price and its rival’s safety level, and
upward-sloping in its rival’s price and its own safety level, and that the firms’ demand functions are
symmetric.  Thus, firm i’s profit, denoted BOi (pA, pB, 2A, 2B), i = A, B, is:
BOi (pA, pB, 2A, 2B) / piqOi  - (1 - 2i)LDOqOi  - k2iqOi , i = A, B.
   Results of the Analysis under the O-Regime
The equilibrium prices, aggregate quantities and profits (for given 2A and 2B) are detailed
in the following proposition; as indicated earlier, let POs t, QOs t, AOs t be (respectively) the equilibrium
price, quantity and profit for a firm of type s, facing a rival of type t. 
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Proposition 1.
i)  The full information (O-regime) ex post equilibrium prices, quantities and profits for a
firm with safety level 2s (s = L, H) facing a rival with safety level 2t (t = L, H) are as
follows:
POs t = (1 - 2s)LDO + k2s + , + (2s - 2t)(LO - k)/3,
QOs t = N(, + (2s - 2t)(LO - k)/3)/2,,
and AOs t = N[, + (2s - 2t)(LO -  k)/3]2/2,.
ii)  Each firm’s ex ante expected price, denoted E2[PO], is:
E2[PO] = (1- :)LDO + :k + ,.
iii)  Each firm’s ex ante expected profit, denoted E2[AO], is:
E2[AO] = N,/2 + 8(1 - 8))2(LO - k)2N/9,.
The equilibrium price for firm i has a nice interpretation:  it is the firm’s full marginal cost
plus an adjustment due to the two forms of product differentiation.  The first two terms together
comprise the full marginal cost of a unit of good i when firm i’s safety level is 2i; the first term is
the firm’s expected loss from liability, a downstream cost, while the second term is the marginal cost
of physical production of the good, a current cost.  The last two terms together reflect the two types
of product differentiation, with the first term indicating a mark-up due to horizontal differentiation
and the second term providing an adjustment for vertical differentiation.  Notice that, since the
support of ( is [-,, ,], the greater the extent of horizontal differentiation (,), the higher the price.
The last term is positive (respectively, negative) if the firm’s safety level, 2s, is greater than
(respectively, less than) its rival’s safety level, 2t (t … s).  In order that the price-cost margins and
the quantities be positive, we require that , > )(LO -  k)/3, where ) / 2H - 2L.  Further, a firm’s ex
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ante expected profit is increasing and convex in the extent of vertical differentiation ()) and in the
reduction in social costs that a marginal improvement in safety generates (that is, LO -  k).  Finally,
it is straightforward to compute the equilibrium marginal consumer, 'O(2A, 2B), which is (2A -
2B)(LO -  k)/3, implying that the firm with the higher safety level has the larger market.
Notice that, for s = L, H and t = L, H:
MPOs t/M2s = (2(k - LDO) + LPO)/3;  MPOs t/M2t < 0;
MQOs t/M2s > 0;  MQOs t/M2t < 0;
MAOs t/M2s > 0;  and MAOs t/M2t < 0.
Thus, a firm’s equilibrium quantity and profits are increasing in its own safety level and its
equilibrium price, quantity and profits are decreasing in its rival’s safety level.  The only non-
monotonicity concerns the effect of a firm’s safety level on its own price; as indicated above, this
depends upon the magnitudes of the relative allocation of losses between the consumer and the firm,
as well as the per unit marginal production cost of safety.  Notice that if LDO is less than k, then the
firm’s price and safety level are positively correlated; a similar consideration will hold true in the
incomplete information model below.  On the other hand, if (say) losses are large and the firm
directly bears a substantial portion of them (i.e., LDO is sufficiently greater than k), then the firm’s
price and safety level will be negatively correlated.  This is sensible since, with a high safety level,
the firm is unlikely to face many lawsuits, so its overall liability will be low, which means that it can
afford to set a lower price so as to sell more of its product.  Elsewhere, we have examined these two
possibilities in the context of a monopoly (see Daughety and Reinganum, 1995); there we show that
both the full information and incomplete information (signaling) price responses to own safety level
reflect the allocation of liability between the firm and the consumer, as well as the production cost
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15  Note that this assumption implies the assumption on , made earlier for the O-regime.
parameter k.  In this paper we emphasize the positive linkage between price and safety, which arises
when the firm’s full marginal cost is increasing in the safety of its product.  Thus, we make the
following assumption, which guarantees that MPOs t/M2s is positive.
Assumption 2.  k > LDO.
Using Proposition 1 and Assumption 2, we find that the prices, quantities and profits are ordered
based upon the types of the two firms.
Proposition 2.  Full information (O-regime) prices, quantities and profits, as a function of
own and rival’s types, are ordered as follows.
i) POHL > POHH > POLL > POLH;
ii) QOHL > QOHH = QOLL > QOLH;
iii) AOHL > AOHH = AOLL > AOLH.
Notice that price, output level and profit are highest for the high-type firm (and lowest for the low-
type firm) in an industry with asymmetric safety.  If the firms are symmetric with respect to safety,
then profits and quantities are equal since there is no vertical differentiation, but prices still differ
because the full marginal cost is increasing in safety-level.
Analysis When Product Safety is Private Information
 Assumption 2 implies that k > LDC.  We assume a further parameter restriction for the
analysis to follow.  First, to maintain interiority of the realized quantities, we require , > 8)LPC.
Second, we assume that , > )LPC/2; this is sufficient to guarantee a unique equilibrium price-pair.15
Together, this means that we assume that , > max{8)LPC, )LPC/2}.
Given the timing of the game, only consumers need construct beliefs about firm types, as
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only they will observe the prices chosen by the firms before taking an action.  Since each firm knows
only its own type, the consumer’s belief about the firm’s type depends only on that firm’s price.
Therefore, let bi(pi) be a representative consumer’s belief about firm i’s type based on its price pi.
Thus, a consumer of type ( will buy from firm A if:
V - (pA + (1 - bA(pA)LPC) > V - (pB + (1 - bB(pB)LPC) + (,
and will otherwise buy from firm B.  Hence, for any pair of prices pA and pB, the marginal type of
consumer is (C = pB - pA - (bB(pB) - bA(pA))LPC .
We seek to characterize a separating equilibrium.  Similar to the earlier derivation under full
information, firm A’s expected aggregate quantity sold under incomplete information, if it
announces price pA and firm B uses the separating price strategy pB(2), is:
qAC(pA, pB(2)) = N{8F[pB(2H) - pA - (2H - bA(pA))LPC] + (1 - 8)F[pB(2L) - pA - (2L - bA(pA))LPC]}.
Again, assuming F is the uniform distribution, this quantity can be written as:
qAC(pA, pB(2)) = (N/2,)(, + E2(pB) - pA + (bA(pA) - :)LPC),
so that firm A’s profits can be expressed as:
BAC(pA, pB(2)) = (pA - (1 - 2A)LDC - k2A)(N/2,)(, + E2(pB) - pA + (bA(pA) - :)LPC).
Similarly, firm B’s profits can be expressed as:
BBC(pB, pA(2)) = (pB - (1 - 2B)LDC - k2B)(N/2,)(, + E2(pA) - pB + (bB(pB) - :)LPC).
Since the firms have symmetric cost and demand functions, and since the prior distribution
over safety level is also the same for both firms, we will focus on the symmetric separating perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.  This equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that both firms use the same
pricing strategy, and each consumer’s belief about a firm’s type is purely dependent upon the
observed price (that is, bA(p) = bB(p)).  The equilibrium is revealing since each firm’s price is type-
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dependant; both firms will post the same price if and only if they have the same type.  Moreover,
consumers’ beliefs should be correct; that is, the equilibrium belief about a firm’s type based on its
price will be the type that would, in equilibrium, post that price.  Thus, we define firm i’s  profit as
a function of its price, p, its actual type, 2, and the type a consumer believes it to be, 2~, as:
Bi(p, 2, 2~ | E2(pj)) / (p - (1 - 2)LDC - k2)(N/2,)(, + E2(pj) - pA + (2~ - :)LPC), i, j = A, B, i…j.
Definition.  A symmetric separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of a pair of prices
(PLC, PHC) and beliefs bC(C) such that for i = A, B, j = A, B, i…j:
i)  Bi(PLC, 2L, 2L | E2(pj)) >  maxp Bi(p, 2L, bC(p) | E2(pj));
ii)  Bi(PHC, 2H, 2H | E2(pj)) >  maxp Bi(p, 2H, bC(p) | E2(pj));
iii)  bC(PLC) = 2L, bC(PHC) = 2H;
iv)  E2(pj) = 8PHC + (1 - 8)PLC.
Requirements (i) and (ii) are incentive compatibility restrictions; in conjunction with (iii),
these conditions guarantee a separating equilibrium in which the firm’s revealing prices are also best
responses to the expected price set by the firm’s rival.  The technique for finding this equilibrium
will be to solve (i) and (ii) for separating equilibrium prices expressed as functions of E2(pj), and
then to employ (iv) to solve for the equilibrium prices.
   Results for the Analysis under the C-Regime
 The following proposition provides the unique (refined) solution to the above conditions and
the implied interim quantities; due to their complexity of expression, the interim payoffs are
displayed in the Appendix (where the refinement used is also discussed).  For convenience, let 0 =
8 + ((1 - 8)2 + 4,/)LPC)1/2; it is straightforward to show that 0 > 1, and that it is increasing in both
8 and ,.
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Proposition 3.
i) There is a unique (refined) symmetric separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium with prices
and supporting beliefs as follows:
PCL = (1 - 2L)LDC + k2L + , + )LPC8(0 - 1)/2;
PCH = (1 - 2H)LDC + k2H + , + )[LPC(1 + 8)(0 - 1)/2 + LC - k];
bC(p) = 2L when p < PCH, and bC(p) = 2H when p > PCH.
ii)  The implied interim quantities are:
QCL = N/2 + N)LPC8(0 - 1)/4, and QCH = N/2 - N)LPC(1 - 8)(0 - 1)/4,.
First, let us consider the equilibrium prices.  With a little algebra, it can be shown that PCH can be re-
expressed as:
PCH = PCL + )LPC(0 + 1)/2. (1)
Thus, higher safety is associated with a higher price.  Moreover, equation (1) provides a particularly
convenient form for expressing the expected equilibrium price for either firm:
E2[PC] = (1 - 2L)LDC + k2L + , + )LPC80 . (2)
Next, note that the equilibrium interim quantities are declining in own-safety level:  QCH < QCL.
Thus, even though 2H > 2L, the expected output to be produced by a firm that knows it is of type H
is less than that of a firm which is of type L; as we will see in the comparisons section below, this
will have an important implication for average product quality.
It is also worth observing that both separating prices are functions of 8, and therefore are
influenced by details of the prior distribution over 2.  As shown in the Supplementary Appendix,
this is true for all the (interim) equilibrium variables of interest, as indicated in the following
proposition.
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16  The best response functions suggest that the same properties would hold if the prior
probabilities were firm-specific.  More precisely, let 8i be the probability that firm i is a high type,
i = A, B.  Then an increase in 8i results in a best response by firm j to increase its price (since each
type of firm j has a best response which is increasing in the expected price firm i will post).  Because
of strategic complementarity, this price increase by j leads to an increase in firm i’s type-specific
prices.  Clearly an increase in 8j directly affects firm i’s type-specific prices.  Thus, firm i’s type-
specific prices are increasing in 8i and 8j.
Proposition 4.  The separating prices, PCL and PCH, the difference in the separating prices, PCH -
PCL, the expected price E2[PC] for each firm, the interim quantities, and the interim profits are
increasing in 8.
Proposition 4 is somewhat surprising because, with respect to the prior, separating equilibria are
usually only influenced by the support of the prior (that is, {2L, 2H}).  In this analysis we find that
as the proportion of H-types increases so do both separating prices, the interim quantity a firm plans
to produce and the interim profits it expects to achieve.  This reflects two effects.  First, prices are
strategic complements, so a higher price on the part of one firm means that the other firm can charge
a higher price.  Since each firm is best-responding to the expected price of the other firm, anything
that will cause that expected price to rise (in this case, the increased likelihood that the rival firm is
an H-type) will result in a higher price by the best-responder.  This leads to higher profits for the
responding firm.  Second, this is a separating equilibrium, so higher profits for the H-type firm
increase the incentive for the L-type firm to mimic it, which means that the H-type firm must further
increase its price so as to maintain within-firm price separation; this is why the gap between the
separating prices grows.  Thus, a combination of inter-firm strategic interaction and intra-firm (i.e.,
inter-type) interaction acts to lessen the intensity of competition and to increase prices and profits
as 8 increases.16
Both firms move simultaneously, posting their appropriate separating prices.  Consumers
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then purchase the good from one or the other of the firms.  The ex post prices are the same as the
interim prices, but the ex post quantities and profits are not the same as their interim counterparts.
Let QCs t and ACs t be (respectively) the equilibrium ex post quantity and profit for a firm of type s,
facing a rival of type t, in the C-regime.  Since the prices are revealing, the types are correctly
inferred, so that QCs t = N(, + PCt  - PCs  + (2s - 2t)LPC)/2,, for s, t = L, H.  This means that:
QCHH = QCLL = N/2; QCHL = N/2 - N)LPC(0 - 1)/4,; and QCLH = N/2 + N)LPC(0 - 1)/4,. (3)
Alternatively, using the interim prices, the (realized) equilibrium marginal consumer, 'C(2A, 2B),
is computed to be (2B - 2A))LPC(0 - 1)/2, re-emphasizing the result that the firm with higher safety
has the smaller market share.  Again, due to their notational complexity we relegate the expressions
of the associated ex post profits to the Appendix.  The proposition below provides the rankings of
the ex post quantities and profits; the equation determining the cut-point 8-, and that it belongs to (0,
1), is shown in the Supplementary Appendix.
Proposition 5.  Ex post (C-regime) quantities and profits, as a function of own and rival’s
types, are ordered as follows.
i)  QCLH > QCHH = QCLL > QCHL;
ii)  There exists 8- 0 (0, 1) such that ACHH = ACLH for 8 = 8
-
.  Moreover:
ACHL < ACLL < ACLH < ACHH for all 8 < 8
-
 and ACHL < ACLL < ACHH < ACLH for all 8 > 8
-
.
Thus, in contrast with the full information version, under the C-regime and asymmetric safety, the
firm with the high safety level provides the smaller output level and has the lowest profits; we return
to this point below in the section on comparisons between the two regimes.
4.  Comparing the Equilibria of the Open and Confidential Regimes
A comparison of the results in the foregoing propositions yields two types of results:  global
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and restricted.  Restricted results refer to comparisons that rely on one of three possible restrictions
of the parameter region:  1) , sufficiently large, suggesting results that will hold when the extent of
horizontal differentiation is large (i.e., consumers are more likely to view the goods as weak
substitutes); 2) <C and <O are close in value, meaning that confidentiality is weakly effective in
reducing the viability of a suit relative to openness (note that this doesn’t constrain overall case
viability); 3) 8 close to one (zero), meaning that there is a high likelihood that each firm is a high
(low) type.
Global Comparisons
Based on Proposition 1 and the equations displayed in (3), comparing the values and
rankings for the realized quantities Qrst (s = H, L; t = H, L; r = O,C) provides Proposition 6:
Proposition 6.
i) QCs s = QOs s for s = H or L;
ii) QCLH > QOLH while QCHL < QOHL.
Thus, while an H-firm facing an L-firm in an O-regime produces a greater output than its rival, the
reverse is true in a C-regime.  This has an immediate application to the ex ante average quality of
the product placed on the market by the industry.
Proposition 7.  The ex ante average safety of a unit produced under the C-regime is lower
than that produced under the O-regime.
Thus, confidentiality leads to lower average product safety.  Elsewhere we have shown that a similar
result obtains when there is monopoly provision of safety (see Daughety and Reinganum, 2003).
The difference between the two results is that in the monopoly case, it is the rational response of
consumers to the presence of incomplete information that causes them to reduce demand in response
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to a higher price, which reduces the number of higher safety products that are sold.  In the current
paper, the reduction in quality is due to competition between the firms; as the H-type firm distorts
its price upward, so as to separate (from its own alter-ego), it shifts demand to the L-type firm; if
both firms are the same type, consumers cannot obtain a better deal at the other firm, so they split
evenly between the firms.
Next, let us consider realized profits; using the results in Propositions 1 and 5, and the
formulae in the Appendix, we find that confidentiality leads to higher realized profits for all
combinations of types except for one.
Proposition 8.  For 8 0 (0, 1),  ACs s > AOs s, s = L or H; ACLH > AOLH.
The reason that Proposition 8 does not extend to the profits for an H-type firm facing an L-type rival
is suggested by comparing Proposition 2(iii) with Proposition 5(ii):  the profit for such a firm is
ranked at the top of all alternative combinations of types if the regime is open and at the bottom if
the regime is confidential. 
The following proposition provides a comparison of realized social welfare for the symmetric
cases; since social cost is lower under confidentiality than under openness (LC < LO), social welfare
is higher in the symmetric cases.  Analogous to earlier notation, SWrst / SWr(2s, 2t).
Proposition 9.  SWCs s > SWOs s for s = H or L, with equality only at <C = <O.
Restricted Comparisons
Realized-price comparisons between the two regimes (that is, comparisons of realized prices
under C and O) and comparisons of ex ante expected profits and social welfare between the two
regimes can be derived under specific restrictions on the parameter space, as suggested above.  We
first provide the relevant ordering conditions for the realized prices without parameter restrictions
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and then summarize our results in a proposition.
   Ordering the Realized Prices
Proposition 2(i) indicates that the full information realized prices are ordered as:  POHL > POHH
> POLL > POLH.  An obvious question is when does incomplete information result in a firm choosing
a higher (type-specific) price than it would under full information.  Thus, we provide conditions such
that PCL > POLL (and thus PCL > POLH as well) and such that PCH > POHL (and thus PCH > POHH as well):
PCL > POLL if and only if )LPC8(0 - 1)/2 > (1 - 2L)(LDO - LDC); (4)
PCH > POHL if and only if )[LPC(8 + 1)(0 - 1)/2 + LC - k - (LO - k)/3] > (1 - 2H)(LDO - LDC). (5)
   Restricted Comparisons Results
The following propositions provide restrictions on the parameter space that yield sufficient
conditions for orderings of prices or profits of interest.
Proposition 10.  For fixed 8 0 (0,1):
i)  there exists , sufficiently large such that PCL > POLL and PCH > POHL;
ii)  there exists <C sufficiently close to <O such that PCL > POLL and PCH > POHL.
Proposition 10 says that confidentiality results in higher prices than would occur under
openness when either the extent of horizontal differentiation is great (, large) or the case viability
under confidentiality is close to that under openness.  Both conditions are readily derivable from the
inequalities provided in (4) and (5) above.  Note that the strict inequality in (4) will fail to hold
should 8 = 0.  This means that conditions can readily exist such that, for example, PCL < POLL.  Finally,
due to Proposition 4, the relevant realized price distortions (that is, PCL - POLL and PCH - POHL) are
increasing in 8.
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Proposition 11:
i)  For fixed , and fixed <C < <O, there exists 8 sufficiently large such that
E2[AC] > E2[AO];
ii)  for fixed 8 0 (0,1) and fixed <C < <O, there exists , sufficiently large such that
E2[AC] > E2[AO].
Proposition 11 considers the ex ante profits for a duopolist under the C- versus O-regimes.
When 8 is sufficiently large then C is strictly preferred to O.  In particular (see the Appendix):
lim861 {E2[AC] - E2[AO]} = N()(LC - k) + (4,)LPC).5)/2.
Thus, when the population is (sufficiently) preponderantly H-types, the difference in C- and O-
regime ex ante expected profits is positive and increasing in the extent of horizontal differentiation
(,) and in the extent of vertical differentiation ()):  greater differentiation means greater profits
under confidentiality than under openness.  Tying this together with earlier results (in particular,
Propositions 10 and 8), this preference by firms for C over O arises because confidentiality acts to
attenuate competition between the two firms:  realized prices are higher than under openness,
realized profits are higher for three of the four possible configurations of safety levels, and ex ante
expected profits are higher.  Alternatively put, one might expect to see confidentiality play a more
significant role in industries producing products with important safety considerations and where
there may be other causes of product differentiation (e.g., brand adherence).  Moreover, if
horizontal differentiation is great enough, then confidentiality means higher profits for the firm in
comparison with those obtained under openness.
Recall that in monopoly price-quality signaling models (such as, e.g., Bagwell and Riordan,
1991, and Daughety and Reinganum, 1995), the distortion associated with using price to signal
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quality reduces profits so that, all else equal, a monopolist would prefer that its quality be observable
to consumers. When confidentiality also reduces case viability, this preference for openness is
moderated, but a monopolist would prefer an open regime to a confidential one if <C were
sufficiently close to <O (see, e.g., Daughety and Reinganum, 2003).  However, in the current model
the upward price distortions associated with using price to signal quality can improve equilibrium
profits for the firms, since they relax the intensity of price competition.
Finally, consider the basic tradeoff between the social benefits of confidentiality and its
social costs.  As indicated in Proposition 9, realized social welfare is higher in regime C when both
firms have the same realized type, simply because the social costs of an accident are lower in regime
C than in regime O, and all output is produced at the same social cost.  However, when the realized
firm types are different, there is a reallocation of output toward the low-safety firm (in the C-
regime), which tends to reduce realized social welfare.  Although no general ranking of realized
social welfare across regimes is possible (when realized firm types are different), it is easily shown
that realized social welfare is higher in regime O when <C is sufficiently close to <O.  The Appendix
provides the formula for E2[SWC] - E2[SWO], the difference in ex ante expected social welfare
between confidential and open regimes, which leads to the following result.
Proposition 12.
i)  For fixed , and fixed  <C < <O, and 8 either sufficiently large or sufficiently small,
E2[SWC] > E2[SWO];
ii)  For fixed , and fixed 8 0 (0,1), there exists <C sufficiently close to <O such that
E2[SWC] < E2[SWO].
Comparing element (ii) of Proposition 12 and Proposition 11, we see that there is a region of the
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parameter space, where <C is sufficiently close to <O, and either 8 is high (but not 1) or , is
sufficiently high, wherein firms prefer confidentiality and society prefers openness.  Of course,
society may prefer confidentiality as well if <C sufficiently below <O means that social costs are
reduced sufficiently by confidentiality (due to reducing the viability of cases) to compensate for the
effects of confidentiality on prices and the concomitant reduction in average product safety.
The Consumer Satisfaction Model
As discussed in the Introduction, this version of the model assumes that vertical
differentiation is in terms of high- and low-quality, measured by (unverifiable) consumer satisfaction
with the product.  Price is used to signal quality, but now all losses are borne by the consumer (L rD
= 0, r = C, O; LrP = *, r = C, O), where C now simply refers to incomplete information about quality
and O refers to there being complete information about quality.  Essentially, we have eliminated
Stage 3 of the previous game by setting <C = <O = 0.
The results are summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1.  When quality represents consumer satisfaction, incomplete information:
i)  distorts all prices upward;
ii)  reduces ex ante average product quality;
iii)  enhances realized profits for all possible firm configurations except for a high-
quality firm facing a low-quality rival;
iv)  enhances ex ante expected profits when either a) 8 is sufficiently large or b) ,
is sufficiently large;
v)  reduces ex ante expected social welfare.
These results again reflect the mutual reinforcement of strategic complementarity between the firms
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and inter-type (i.e., intra-firm) competition resulting in distortionary pricing to enable signaling.
Here, ex ante expected social welfare is unambiguously reduced by this distortionary effect, while
ex ante expected profits are enhanced when either quality is very likely to be high or when the extent
of horizontal differentiation is great.
5. Further Observations and Conclusions
We briefly consider the effect of minimum quality regulation on the confidentiality model
and two possible extensions (two firms with a continuum of types and n firms with two possible
types each).
Minimum Quality Regulation
We now return to the interpretation of quality as the product’s safety level.  Since, as shown
earlier, average product quality is lower under confidentiality, one might naturally wonder how
minimum quality regulation might affect that equilibrium.  While a full investigation is beyond the
scope of the current paper, a simple examination of the comparative static wherein we marginally
increase 2L is suggestive.  The following can be shown:
i)  MPCH/M2L < 0; M[PCH - PCL]/M2L < 0;
ii)  MQCLH/M2L < 0; MQCHL/M2L > 0;
iii)  ME2[SWC]/M2L > 0.
Thus, in sum, a small increase in 2L reduces both the H-type price and the gap between the
H- and L-prices, brings asymmetric-safety-level industry outputs closer together, and increases
welfare.  This is because the increase in 2L (holding all else constant) reduces the extent of vertical
differentiation, and thereby reduces the extent to which prices are distorted (at least for the H-type).
This is especially evident since the difference between the interim prices decreases as well.
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17  The differential equation is an Abel equation of the second kind (see, e.g., Zwillinger,
1989, p. 120).  We have not found a closed-form solution, making the next step (finding the
expectation of the price strategy and solving for the symmetric equilibrium) problematic.
Moreover, note that (in the C-regime) increasing 2L causes the realized quantities to shift so as to
reduce the extent to which average product quality falls below that obtained in the O-regime.
Extension of the Model to Allow for a Continuum of Types
One potential extension is to allow the type space for each firm to be the interval [2L, 2H]
rather than the pair {2L, 2H}; that is, to allow for a continuum of types rather than simply two types.
A variant of the monopoly version of such a problem was examined in Daughety and Reinganum
(1995), yielding a characterization of the (implicitly-specified) price strategy.  In the duopoly
version, the first order condition for a firm is a differential equation that contains the expected price
for the rival firm, so that (as in the two-type model) a firm’s best response is a function of the
expected price of its rival.  Thus, in theory, one could now solve the differential equation (akin to
solving the conditions (i) - (iii) in the definition of the symmetric separating PBE above, except now
for a continuum of such inequalities) and then again take the expectation of the resulting price
function (which is itself conditional on that expectation; see the PBE definition, element (iv)), find
the solution, and then characterize the resulting equilibrium.  For those readers who have solved
continuum-type signaling games, the foregoing phrase “in theory” will be understood to be an
understatement about the complexity of actually doing this.17  We do expect that if the price strategy
could be found, it (and the interim price differences, quantities and expected profits) would share
properties with that derived in the two-type model (see Proposition 4); that is, under reasonable
assumptions, those functions would be increasing in the relative preponderance of “higher” types
of safety level (holding the support [2L, 2H] fixed).
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18  If r = O then bi(2i) / 2i, while if r = C, then we would look for beliefs such that the 2i are
revealed in equilibrium by the interim prices.
19  In the earlier analysis of two firms, ( was the difference in the firm-specific ui terms.
Extension of the Model to Allow for n Firms
Alternatively, consider the extension of the earlier analysis to allow for n firms (all
independently) being one of two types {2L, 2H} with 8 =Pr{2i = 2H}, i = 1, ..., n.  Assume that each
consumer, facing a vector of firm prices (p1, ..., pn) and associated believed18 safety levels (b1(21),
..., bn(2n)), obtains a net surplus from the consumption of product i of V + ui - (pi + (1 - bi(2i))LPC.19
Thus, after specifying a distribution over the private information for a consumer, this problem
resembles the quantal-response model in the discrete-choice literature (see, e.g., Judge, et. al., 1980,
Chapter 14).  Again, this extension is easier to recommend than to actually perform, but (in theory)
demand functions would have similar properties to those discussed in the two-firm example
(especially symmetry).  Note that the only changes to the symmetric separating PBE definition
would occur in the conditioning term E2(pj) (which appears in elements (i), (ii), and (iv) of the
definition), which would involve the expectation of the price strategies presented by the n-1 rivals.
Conclusions
We have provided a model in which two firms, and a continuum of consumers, have private
information about their own payoffs; a unique (refined) separating equilibrium price function is
characterized.  Although it is typical in monopoly signaling models that only the support of the
distribution matters in a separating equilibrium, in this case the prior distribution enters through a
firm’s expectation about its rival.  It is shown that the equilibrium prices, the difference between
these type-specific prices, the associated outputs, and profits are all increasing functions of the
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probability of high safety (8).  Since a high-safety firm charges a high price, if there is a higher
chance that the rival has high safety, then there is a higher chance that it will charge a high price;
since prices are strategic complements, it is a best response for the firm to raise its price as well.
We have indexed the continuation value of the game, following a consumer purchase, by a
parameter <, which reflects case viability in the product safety application of the model and affects
the overall level of losses, as well as their allocation between the firm and the harmed consumer.
We argued that confidentiality may reduce case viability, so that <C < <O (for the consumer
satisfaction version of the model, <C = <O = 0).  Since each viable case is associated with costs of
using the legal system, the total losses associated with an accident are lower under confidentiality.
When <C is sufficiently close to <O (and, therefore, in the consumer satisfaction version as
well), then unobservable quality causes all prices to be distorted upward, and lowers average quality
and ex ante expected social welfare, but increases ex ante expected firm profits (when either the
probability of high quality or the extent of horizontal product differentiation is sufficiently high).
This latter result is in contrast with monopoly signaling models, wherein the distortion associated
with signaling reduces ex ante expected profits.  Finally, when <C < <O, then there are regions of the
parameter space wherein ex ante expected social welfare is higher under confidentiality.  In
particular, this occurs when 8 is either very high or very low, because in this case welfare-reducing
output distortions associated with signaling asymmetric safety levels are very unlikely to occur, and
thus the primary effect of confidentiality is to reduce the anticipated costs associated with use of the
legal system.  As indicated above, we expect that these results are likely to be robust to
generalizations such as increasing the number of types and/or firms, but these remain the subject of
on-going and future research.
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Appendix
This Appendix provides equilibrium expressions too complex for inclusion in the text, the
derivation of the symmetric separating equilibrium price function and the proof of Propositions 3.
The proofs of Propositions 4, 5 and 11 and some discussion of the settlement bargaining subgame
can be found in a Supplementary Appendix.  The proofs of Propositions 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12
follow from straightforward algebraic manipulations and are therefore omitted.
Interim Equilibrium Payoffs in a Confidential Regime
Recall that 0 = 8 + ((1 - 8)2 + 4,/)LPC)½ and that 0 > 1 for all 8 , (0, 1).  For the confidential
regime, the equilibrium payoffs at the interim stage are given by:
Bi(PCL, 2L , 2L | E2(PC)) = (PCL - (1 - 2L)LDC - k2L)QCL = (N/2,){, + )LPC8(0 - 1)/2}2.
Bi(PCH, 2H , 2H | E2(PC)) = (PCH - (1 - 2H)LDC - k2H)QCH 
= {, + )[LPC(1 + 8)(0 - 1)/2 + LC - k]}(N/2,){, - )LPC(1 - 8)(0 - 1)/2}.
Derivation of the Symmetric Separating Equilibrium Price Function
Recall the function describing firm i’s  profit as a function of its price, p, its actual type, 2,
and the type a consumer believes it to be, 2~:
Bi(p, 2, 2~ | E2(pj)) / (p - (1 - 2)LDC - k2)(N/2,)(, + E2(pj) - pA + (2~ - :)LPC), i, j = A, B, i…j.
Define cs / (1 - 2s)LDC + k2s, s = L, H and dt / , + E2(pj) + (2~t - :)LPC, t = L, H.  Then we can use the
short-hand notation Bst(p) = (p - cs)(dt - p) to denote the profits of a firm charging p whose actual
type is s, and whose perceived type is t.  Note that for any given price, it is always more profitable
to be perceived as type H, regardless of true type; and for any given price, it is better to be type L,
regardless of perceived type.  If there were no signaling considerations, then Bst would be maximized
by Dst = (cs + dt)/2, and the resulting profits would be Bst = (dt - cs)2/4.  These prices (actually, “best
responses” to E2(pj)) are ordered as follows:  DHH > DLH > DHL > DLL.  The only non-obvious case is
DLH > DHL; this holds if and only if dH - dL > cH - cL, which is ensured by Assumption 1.  Note:  in
order for the price-cost margins and quantities to be positive for all combinations of s and t, we need
to maintain assumptions sufficient for all of these profits to be positive; the tightest constraint is dL -
cH > 0.  We will verify that this inequality holds under our maintained assumptions on ,.
Our method of deriving the separating equilibrium prices is to first derive a best response
function for firm i that reflects the need to signal its type.  This will consist of a pair (DLC(E2(pj)),
DHC(E2(pj))).  We will then impose the equilibrium condition that 8DHC(E2(pj)) + (1 - 8)DLC(E2(pj)) =
E2(pj) and solve for a fixed point.  Finally, the resulting solution (denoted E2[PC] in the text) is
substituted into (DLC(E2(pj)), DHC(E2(pj))) to obtain the equilibrium prices (which are denoted PCL and
PCH in the text).
No firm is willing to distort its price away from its best response (were its type known) in
order to be perceived as type L (since this is the worst type to be perceived to be).  Thus, if a firm
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of type L is perceived as such, its best response is DLL, which yields profits of (dL - cL)2/4.  If a firm
of type H is perceived as being of type L, its best response is DHL, which yields profits of (dL - cH)2/4.
However, either firm would be willing to distort its price away from its best response (were
its type known) in order to be perceived as type H.  Thus, a candidate for a revealing equilibrium
must involve a best response for type H that satisfies two conditions.  First, it must deter mimicry
by the type L firm (who thus reverts to DLL); and second, it must be worthwhile for the type H firm
to use this price rather than to allow itself to be perceived as a type L firm (and thus revert to DHL).
Formally, a separating best response for the type H firm is a member of the following set:
{p | (p - cL)(dH - p) < (dL - cL)2/4 and (p - cH)(dH - p) > (dL - cH)2/4}.
The first inequality says that the type L firm prefers to price at DLL (and be perceived as type L) than
to price at p (and be perceived as type H).  The second inequality says that the type H firm prefers
to price at p (and be perceived as type H) than to price at DHL (and be perceived as type L).  Solving
these two inequalities implies that the H-type firm’s best response belongs to the interval:
 
[.5{dH + cL + ((dH - cL)2 - (dL - cL)2)½}, .5{dH + cH + ((dH - cH)2 - (dL - cH)2)½}].  
This entire interval involves prices in excess of DHH = (dH + cH)/2; thus, the type H firm distorts its
price upwards from the best response function it would follow if it were known to be of type H.
Refinement.  We have identified an interval of candidates for the type H firm’s best response.  We
now apply a version of refinement based on equilibrium domination (see Mas-Colell, Whinston and
Green, 1995, pp. 470-471, for a discussion of equilibrium domination and the Intuitive Criterion of
Cho and Kreps, 1987).  It is appropriate to apply this refinement at this stage in the game because,
conditional on any common conjecture (common to firm i and consumers) about firm j’s strategy
(including firm j’s equilibrium strategy), what remains is simply a signaling game between firm i’s
two types and consumers.  The equilibrium domination refinement (Intuitive Criterion) says that
consumers should infer type H from firm i’s price p so long as type H would be willing to charge
p, yet mimicry by type L would be deterred, even under this most-favorable inference.  Thus, the
firm of type H distorts its best response to the minimum extent necessary to deter mimicry by its
alter-ego (type L).  Formally, this means that if firm i and consumers entertain the same price
function for firm j, then firm i can convince consumers that it is of type H by playing the separating
best response DHC(E2(pj)) = .5{dH + cL + ((dH - cL)2 - (dL - cL)2)½}.  As argued above, type L’s best
response is DLC(E2(pj)) = (dL + cL)/2.  Note that E2(pj) enters these functions through the terms dH and
dL.
Each type of firm i plays a best response to firm j’s separating strategy (which is
summarized, for firm i’s purposes, by its expected value).  Then in a symmetric equilibrium, the
equilibrium expected price, which was denoted E2[PC] in the text, is a solution to the equation: 
X = 8DHC(X) + (1 - 8)DLC(X). (A1)
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Let Y = X - cL and let " = , + LPC[.5(2H + 2L) - :].  Then equation (A1) becomes
Y =  , + 8[2)LPC(Y + ")]½. (A2)
Let Y > 0 be the domain (Y < 0 implies that E2[PC] < cL, which could not be part of an equilibrium
since it implies that the firm has a negative price-cost margin in at least one state of the world).
Moreover, to ensure that the expression under the square root sign is positive, we assume that " >
0; a sufficient condition for " > 0 for all 8 0 (0, 1) is:  , > )LPC/2.  This sufficient condition is
sometimes stronger than necessary, but it is parsimonious.  Next, let W = [2)LPC(Y + ")]½; thus, W
must be a positive number.  Then (A2) becomes:
W2 - W82)LPC - (" + ,)2)LPC = 0. (A3)
This equation has a unique positive root given by W* = )LPC0, where 0 is as defined at the
beginning of this Appendix.  Thus, reversing the sequence of substitutions, we obtain:
E2[PC] = (1 - 2L)LDC + k2L + , + 8)LPC0.
Moreover, it can be shown that the assumption , > )LPC/2 ensures that dL - cH > 0 for all 8 0 (0, 1).
Finally, we substitute E2[PC] into (DLC(C), DHC(C)) to obtain:
PCL = (1 - 2L)LDC + k2L + , + )LPC8(0 - 1)/2
PCH = (1 - 2H)LDC + k2H + , + )[LPC(1 + 8)(0 - 1)/2 + LC - k].
Proof of Proposition 3.  We have restricted attention to symmetric separating equilibria, and we
have identified a unique (refined) candidate.  To verify that the strategies and beliefs do provide a
separating equilibrium, suppose that firm j plays the strategy (PCL, PCH) given above, with expected
value E2[PC], and that consumers maintain the beliefs:  bC(p) = 2L when p < PCH, and bC(p) = 2H when
p > PCH.  Then, by construction, the type L firm i would be unwilling to charge a price at or above
PCH (which is equal to DHC(E2[PC]) in order to be taken for type H.  Rather, it will prefer to be taken
for type L and to charge the price PCL (which is equal to DLC(E2[PC]).  On the other hand, the type H
firm i would be willing to charge a price at or somewhat above PCH (which is equal to DHC(E2[PC]) in
order to be taken for type H, but among these it prefers the lowest; that is, PCH.  The consumers’
beliefs are correct in equilibrium, and E2[PC] = 8PCH + (1 - 8)PCL.  QED
Realized Equilibrium Profits in a Confidential Regime
For the confidential regime, the realized equilibrium profits are given by: ACs t = (PCs  - (1 -
2s)LDC - k2s)QCs t , s, t = L, H.
ACHL = {, + )[LPC(1 + 8)(0 - 1)/2 + LC - k]}(N/2,){, - )LPC(0 - 1)/2}.
ACLL = {, + )LPC8(0 - 1)/2}(N/2).
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ACLH = {, + )LPC8(0 - 1)/2}(N/2,){, + )LPC(0 - 1)/2}.
ACHH = {, + )[LPC(1 + 8)(0 - 1)/2 + LC - k]}(N/2).
The price-cost margins are clearly positive; the only problematical realized quantity is QCHL, and a
necessary and sufficient condition for this to be positive is:  , > 8)LPC.  
Comparison of Ex Ante Expected Profits Across Regimes
Recall that E2[AC] = 8Bi(PCH, 2H , 2H | E2(PC)) + (1 - 8)Bi(PCL, 2L , 2L | E2(PC)) or, alternatively,
E2[AC] = 82ACHH + (1 - 8)2ACLL + 8(1 - 8)(ACHL + ACLH).  This expression is easily-constructed using the
expressions for ACs t, s, t = L, H given above.  Similarly, E2[AO] = 82AOHH + (1 - 8)2AOLL + 8(1 - 8)(AOHL
+ AOLH) is easily-constructed using the formulae in Proposition 1 in the text.  The difference in ex
ante expected profits (and the limit as 8 6 1) are given by:
E2[AC] - E2[AO] = 82[ACHH - AOHH] + (1 - 8)2[ACLL - AOLL] + 8(1 - 8)[(ACHL + ACLH) - (AOHL + AOLH)].
lim861 {E2[AC] - E2[AO]} = lim861 {, + )[LPC(1 + 8)(0 - 1)/2 + LC - k]}(N/2) - N,/2
 
     = N()(LC - k) + (4,)LPC).5)/2.
Comparison of Ex Ante Expected Social Welfare Across Regimes
Let y / (LO - k))/3 and, as above, let  x /)LPC(0 - 1)/2.  Then:
SWOHH = N[V + ,/4 - SCO(2H)] < N[V + ,/4 - SCC(2H)] = SWCHH,
SWOLL = N[V + ,/4 - SCO(2L)} < N[V + ,/4 - SCC(2L)] = SWCLL,
with equality only if <C =  <O.  These inequalities follow directly from the fact that the social costs
of an accident are lower in regime C than in regime O, since the O regime relies more heavily on
the legal system, which is costly.
SWOHL = SWOLH = N[V - SCO(2H)(, + y)/2, - SCO(2L)(, - y)/2, + (,2 - y2)/4,].
SWCHL = SWCLH = N[V - SCC(2H)(, - x)/2, - SCC(2L)(, + x)/2, + (,2 - x2)/4,].
Although no general ranking of these expressions is possible, it is easily shown that SWCHL < SWOHL
as <C 6 <O.  The difference in the ex ante expected social welfare under regime C versus O is:
E2[SWC] - E2[SWO] = 82[SWCHH - SWOHH] + (1 - 8)2[SWCLL - SWOLL] + 28(1 - 8)[SWCHL - SWOHL].
The assertions in Proposition 12 are easily-verified, given the expressions above.
